2011年總結
2008年12月31日，基金資產淨值HK$348,933.99。
2009年12月31日，基金資產淨值HK$324,112.12。
2010年12月31日，基金資產淨值HK$124,520.80。
2011年12月31日，基金資產淨值HK$-79,975.74
全年虧損HK$204,496.54，回報率-164.23%，同期恆生指數回報率-20%。
至於小孩子基金
2008年12月31日，小孩子基金資產淨值HK$15,560.19
2009年12月31日，小孩子基金資產淨值HK$71,196.57
2010年12月31日，小孩子基金資產淨值HK$99,649.11
2011年12月31日，小孩子基金資產淨值HK$91,040.95
全年虧損HK$8,608.16，回報率-8.64%。
2012年策略:收息。
星期五, 12月 30, 2011
星期三, 11月 30, 2011
星期一, 10月 31, 2011
星期五, 9月 30, 2011
星期四, 9月 01, 2011
星期四, 8月 11, 2011
戴子郎下注時的十要
股票市場就是一個大賭場,看看臺灣賭神的下注時的十要能否幫到你?
★博弈十誡★
一、量力而賭
賭既然是一種娛樂，「娛樂費」自然要適度，雖然這種娛樂費不一定會花掉，但如果輸了，也不要傷了元氣。拿老本或借來的錢去賭，容易心虛氣餒，要想贏錢，比登天還難！
二、合法的賭
現在出國很方便，東亞、東南亞地區合法的賭場既多且近，出千的可能性很低。要賭就到合法的地方賭，否則心理壓力大不說，還很容易被騙。
三、累、急、憂、生病時不賭
在累、急、憂、生病時會降低判斷力。根據賭馬的統計，最後幾場時賭獨贏的比率會提高，因為很多人輸急了，想要一下撈回來，偏偏獨贏的機率最低，對賭客最不利。
四、不懂的不賭
有些新手以為只要跟著老鳥就可以了，連規則都不懂就下場，問題是老鳥不一定會賭，有三十年經驗可能只表示他已經錯了三十年，因此「不懂」就要堅持「不賭」。
五、氣氛不對不賭
當你碰上很惡劣的荷官，態度差或一直催促下注，你大可不玩，也不要被他催得失去了冷靜的理智，而起了鬥氣之心，那只是跟錢過不去。
六、勝算太低的不賭
同一個賭戲中，有些賭法是賭場設的陷阱，願者上鉤！例如百家樂下莊輸率1.184%，下閒輸率 1.36%，下和的輸率卻高達13.6%。而除了要選賭戲外，也要懂得選賭場，同一個人，在不同的賭場因規則上的差異，也可能會有不同的結果。
七、醉時不賭
賭場雖然提供「免費」的菸酒，但那絕非真的「免費」。
八、下午不賭 (精神不佳不賭)
根據研究，大部分的人下午精神較差，不妨做為休息時間。但也不能一概而論，主要是應合乎個人的「生活時鐘」，在精神狀態最佳的時段去賭。
九、輸時不怨
願賭服輸。看完電影，會有人想去把錢要回來嗎？
十、堅守「下注十要」
好的資金管理，不保證會贏，但輸家多半沒有好的資金管理。
★下注十要★
一、堅守底線
預定輸多少，輸到了底線就該停止！和玩股票一樣，要有停損的觀念。
二、分配賭本
拿薪水的人會把錢平均的用，到了賭場卻會衝動的一下子輸光。因此，如果預定要玩三天，每天兩段，那麼把賭本分成六份，在這六段時間裡，總有運好運壞的時候，運壞時要輸得有節制，運好時不妨多贏些。
三、嚴守分配，節制輸贏
筆者發現自己常在第一晚輸錢而第二晚扳回。如果在第一晚輸時沒有節制，第二晚可能沒有翻本的機會，有時一開始輸了就想翻本，結果往往更糟。因此如把第一段的錢輸了，不應賭氣，應反過來冷靜想想：全部輸光了以後，剩下的時間更難受。
四、最多賭賭本的3%
一般而言，賭客很難連輸三十回；另一方面，賭太小贏不到較多的錢。因此設定一個賭的上限，使賭戲得以合理的延伸是必需的。
五、贏時加碼
有一種下注叫「累加法」，輸時加倍以求最終贏回；反之，很多人贏錢後想保住戰績，會縮小賭注。其實，真正成功的賭徒都懂得贏時加碼的方法，因為如果連連在贏，至少顯示賭場沒有搞鬼；反之，如果輸時加碼，碰上賭場做手腳的話，結果會很悽慘！
六、鎖住部分贏利
要有停損的觀念，而且停損點要逐漸提高。有些賭場老千早把贏利的一部分立刻匯回。
七、連輸時不加碼
道理同連贏時加碼，且連輸時容易上火，愈打愈大、愈輸愈多。
八、連輸六、七次換桌，連輸兩手換場子
同上理，賭場若太會贏，也許有鬼，就算沒有動手腳也不妨迴避它。爭財不爭氣，不論賭博或做生意都是如此。
九、賭兩種以上
失之東隅，收之桑榆，不要執著於一種賭戲，或許結果會更好！且分散賭戲也有分散風險的效果。
十、堅守「博弈十誡」
=====================================================================================
戴子郎 (台灣賭神)
台大經濟系畢業的戴子郎是台灣賭桌的傳奇人物，
32歲當上證券公司總經理的他，
因為玩股票負債5千萬，
而開始賭博賺錢還債的日子，研究近4百本賭博書籍，每次上賭桌前都要細讀30本賭博書，也因為賭得太神奇了，幾乎每賭必贏，讓戴子郎成為多家賭場的黑名單，韓國境內所有賭場還把他列為拒絕往來戶。
在他10多年的遊賭生涯中，結識了許多世界頂尖的職業賭徒，其中一批熟面孔是來自麻省理工學院的數學高手，這些出身於麻省理工MIT團隊的賭博玩家，在10年內賺進了2千萬美金。
俗話說，十賭九輸，不過靠賭維生的人還大有人在，台灣賭神戴子郎就是一例，他不但靠賭維生還以賭致富，戴子郎說，要成為BLACKJACK21點職業賭徒，單槍匹馬很困難，打團體戰最有利。最著名的就是麻省理工算牌團隊，十多年遊賭生涯，戴子郎結識世界頂尖職業賭徒，其中不乏具有這個團隊出身背景的玩家，雖然是地下社團，卻早已經揚名國際，家喻戶曉
創辦這個地下社團的是前麻省理工學院一名ABC華裔學生張約翰，他現在的地位可是教父級的賭神，曾經被列為 21點名人堂，由於被列為賭場黑名單，爲了進入賭場玩牌，張約翰還經常反串成女人掩人耳目，只要能夠進入這個團隊的人，全都是數學天才。
11年博奕生涯，他出過「賭遊記」、「賭神戴子郎教你嬴」等多本教戰書籍，俗話說十賭九輸似乎不適合用在他身上，戴子郎很不好意思說，他估計11年來，大概賺進了約250萬美金，與其他人賠到傾家蕩產的結局大不相同。而他也提出賭博十戒與下注十要，希望大家能引以為戒
他說，當初他因為炒股票傾家蕩產，如今他十賭九贏，但是，當初他也歷經過艱難的起步過程，不是一般人所能了解的。至於戴子郎是他的筆名，而戴子郎的意思就是帶著兒子的郎，「小孩三歲時我就離婚，當時有雜誌專訪我說，別人是因賭而債，我是因債而賭
戴子郎表示，因為十賭九贏，如今有世界各地都有人追隨在他門下，拜他為師，他說，「那（賭場）是很誘惑的環境，如果在這種環境下，能夠克服這種誘惑，這些人就可能是真正贏到錢的人。」
另據報導，平日相當低調的台灣賭神戴子郎，曾經被世界80多家知名賭場列為不受歡迎人物，他在日前將要周遊世界各國的賭遊經驗，集結成冊，同時更躍身成為作家
戴子郎在接受專訪時，與讀者分享經驗，他說，「什麼叫賭博？各位去買彩券，那麼100塊錢買下去，真正回到手上的獎金，和所有的獎金加起來大概只有60元，所以結果呢？你的100元丟下去，只回來60元。」
★博弈十誡★
一、量力而賭
賭既然是一種娛樂，「娛樂費」自然要適度，雖然這種娛樂費不一定會花掉，但如果輸了，也不要傷了元氣。拿老本或借來的錢去賭，容易心虛氣餒，要想贏錢，比登天還難！
二、合法的賭
現在出國很方便，東亞、東南亞地區合法的賭場既多且近，出千的可能性很低。要賭就到合法的地方賭，否則心理壓力大不說，還很容易被騙。
三、累、急、憂、生病時不賭
在累、急、憂、生病時會降低判斷力。根據賭馬的統計，最後幾場時賭獨贏的比率會提高，因為很多人輸急了，想要一下撈回來，偏偏獨贏的機率最低，對賭客最不利。
四、不懂的不賭
有些新手以為只要跟著老鳥就可以了，連規則都不懂就下場，問題是老鳥不一定會賭，有三十年經驗可能只表示他已經錯了三十年，因此「不懂」就要堅持「不賭」。
五、氣氛不對不賭
當你碰上很惡劣的荷官，態度差或一直催促下注，你大可不玩，也不要被他催得失去了冷靜的理智，而起了鬥氣之心，那只是跟錢過不去。
六、勝算太低的不賭
同一個賭戲中，有些賭法是賭場設的陷阱，願者上鉤！例如百家樂下莊輸率1.184%，下閒輸率 1.36%，下和的輸率卻高達13.6%。而除了要選賭戲外，也要懂得選賭場，同一個人，在不同的賭場因規則上的差異，也可能會有不同的結果。
七、醉時不賭
賭場雖然提供「免費」的菸酒，但那絕非真的「免費」。
八、下午不賭 (精神不佳不賭)
根據研究，大部分的人下午精神較差，不妨做為休息時間。但也不能一概而論，主要是應合乎個人的「生活時鐘」，在精神狀態最佳的時段去賭。
九、輸時不怨
願賭服輸。看完電影，會有人想去把錢要回來嗎？
十、堅守「下注十要」
好的資金管理，不保證會贏，但輸家多半沒有好的資金管理。
★下注十要★
一、堅守底線
預定輸多少，輸到了底線就該停止！和玩股票一樣，要有停損的觀念。
二、分配賭本
拿薪水的人會把錢平均的用，到了賭場卻會衝動的一下子輸光。因此，如果預定要玩三天，每天兩段，那麼把賭本分成六份，在這六段時間裡，總有運好運壞的時候，運壞時要輸得有節制，運好時不妨多贏些。
三、嚴守分配，節制輸贏
筆者發現自己常在第一晚輸錢而第二晚扳回。如果在第一晚輸時沒有節制，第二晚可能沒有翻本的機會，有時一開始輸了就想翻本，結果往往更糟。因此如把第一段的錢輸了，不應賭氣，應反過來冷靜想想：全部輸光了以後，剩下的時間更難受。
四、最多賭賭本的3%
一般而言，賭客很難連輸三十回；另一方面，賭太小贏不到較多的錢。因此設定一個賭的上限，使賭戲得以合理的延伸是必需的。
五、贏時加碼
有一種下注叫「累加法」，輸時加倍以求最終贏回；反之，很多人贏錢後想保住戰績，會縮小賭注。其實，真正成功的賭徒都懂得贏時加碼的方法，因為如果連連在贏，至少顯示賭場沒有搞鬼；反之，如果輸時加碼，碰上賭場做手腳的話，結果會很悽慘！
六、鎖住部分贏利
要有停損的觀念，而且停損點要逐漸提高。有些賭場老千早把贏利的一部分立刻匯回。
七、連輸時不加碼
道理同連贏時加碼，且連輸時容易上火，愈打愈大、愈輸愈多。
八、連輸六、七次換桌，連輸兩手換場子
同上理，賭場若太會贏，也許有鬼，就算沒有動手腳也不妨迴避它。爭財不爭氣，不論賭博或做生意都是如此。
九、賭兩種以上
失之東隅，收之桑榆，不要執著於一種賭戲，或許結果會更好！且分散賭戲也有分散風險的效果。
十、堅守「博弈十誡」
=====================================================================================
戴子郎 (台灣賭神)
台大經濟系畢業的戴子郎是台灣賭桌的傳奇人物，
32歲當上證券公司總經理的他，
因為玩股票負債5千萬，
而開始賭博賺錢還債的日子，研究近4百本賭博書籍，每次上賭桌前都要細讀30本賭博書，也因為賭得太神奇了，幾乎每賭必贏，讓戴子郎成為多家賭場的黑名單，韓國境內所有賭場還把他列為拒絕往來戶。
在他10多年的遊賭生涯中，結識了許多世界頂尖的職業賭徒，其中一批熟面孔是來自麻省理工學院的數學高手，這些出身於麻省理工MIT團隊的賭博玩家，在10年內賺進了2千萬美金。
俗話說，十賭九輸，不過靠賭維生的人還大有人在，台灣賭神戴子郎就是一例，他不但靠賭維生還以賭致富，戴子郎說，要成為BLACKJACK21點職業賭徒，單槍匹馬很困難，打團體戰最有利。最著名的就是麻省理工算牌團隊，十多年遊賭生涯，戴子郎結識世界頂尖職業賭徒，其中不乏具有這個團隊出身背景的玩家，雖然是地下社團，卻早已經揚名國際，家喻戶曉
創辦這個地下社團的是前麻省理工學院一名ABC華裔學生張約翰，他現在的地位可是教父級的賭神，曾經被列為 21點名人堂，由於被列為賭場黑名單，爲了進入賭場玩牌，張約翰還經常反串成女人掩人耳目，只要能夠進入這個團隊的人，全都是數學天才。
11年博奕生涯，他出過「賭遊記」、「賭神戴子郎教你嬴」等多本教戰書籍，俗話說十賭九輸似乎不適合用在他身上，戴子郎很不好意思說，他估計11年來，大概賺進了約250萬美金，與其他人賠到傾家蕩產的結局大不相同。而他也提出賭博十戒與下注十要，希望大家能引以為戒
他說，當初他因為炒股票傾家蕩產，如今他十賭九贏，但是，當初他也歷經過艱難的起步過程，不是一般人所能了解的。至於戴子郎是他的筆名，而戴子郎的意思就是帶著兒子的郎，「小孩三歲時我就離婚，當時有雜誌專訪我說，別人是因賭而債，我是因債而賭
戴子郎表示，因為十賭九贏，如今有世界各地都有人追隨在他門下，拜他為師，他說，「那（賭場）是很誘惑的環境，如果在這種環境下，能夠克服這種誘惑，這些人就可能是真正贏到錢的人。」
另據報導，平日相當低調的台灣賭神戴子郎，曾經被世界80多家知名賭場列為不受歡迎人物，他在日前將要周遊世界各國的賭遊經驗，集結成冊，同時更躍身成為作家
戴子郎在接受專訪時，與讀者分享經驗，他說，「什麼叫賭博？各位去買彩券，那麼100塊錢買下去，真正回到手上的獎金，和所有的獎金加起來大概只有60元，所以結果呢？你的100元丟下去，只回來60元。」
大跌市
美國聯儲局破天荒宣布超低息政策延續至少兩年，試圖穩定金融市場情緒，歐洲又出現新恐慌。昨日市場傳出歐元區核心成員法國將失去AAA主權信貸評級，以及法國第二大銀行法興財困。雖然三大評級機構均出面澄清現時不會降低法國評級，法興亦發聲明否認不利傳言，但無法阻止歐美銀行股遭瘋狂拋售，法興股價下跌兩成，美國兩大銀行摩根大通與美國銀行股價分別跌逾5％與10％，匯控在美國股市預托證券（ADR）大跌逾7％。歐美股市全線下挫，道指早段一度跌超過400點（逾3.6％）。
自標普上周下調美國評級後，市場一直揣測法國可能是下一個失去AAA評級的國家。標普日前派定心丸稱法國評級展望維持為「穩定」，但法國可能失去AAA的傳言昨日再度炒起。法國銀行業，尤其是持有大批「歐豬」國債的銀行，股價齊聲急挫。法興急跌20%，錄得23 年來單日最大跌幅，股價跌至兩年半新低。其他法國銀行股亦暴挫，最大的法國巴黎銀行（BNP Paribas）股價下跌13%，法國農業信貸銀行（Crédit Agricole）亦跌超過14%。
希臘國債減值 法興急挫20%
法國銀行業持有逾400億歐元希臘國債，是希臘最大的海外債主。法興上周表示，由於持有的希臘國債減值，該行將無法達到明年的收益目標，投資者關注其財政健康。市場近日流傳關於法興的不少傳言。英國《星期日郵報》周日曾引述消息人士指法興財政危在旦夕，「已在危機邊緣」，但事後撤回並道歉。昨日開市後，《金融時報》一個網誌表示法興似乎在變賣黃金，但隨後更正指可能是路透社系統出錯。
法興昨發聲明「否認所有市場謠言」。德銀及法巴等歐洲銀行較早時亦已就持有的希臘國債撇帳。分析一直擔心，歐洲銀行可能沒有足夠資金抵禦進一步撇帳。 加上昨日有消息指希臘將會擴大其換債計劃規模，將2020年後到期的國債亦包括在內，再令市場擔心歐洲銀行的財政狀况。
在銀行股拖累下，法國股市急挫逾5%。法國主權債務信貸違約掉期（CDS） 見歷史新高。法國官員昨否認法國將失去AAA評級，三大評級機構惠譽、穆迪與標普亦重申會維持評級。歐盟6個AAA評級國家中，以法國負債最高，現時債務與GDP的比率達85%，遠超歐盟建議的60%水平。法國去年財赤與GDP比例為7.1%，亦遠高於歐盟規定的3％水平。
負債遠超歐盟建議水平
法國政府預計，今年財赤與GDP比率減至5.3％，並計劃在明年把財赤減至4.6%，2013年減至3%。法國總統薩爾科齊昨臨時中斷休假，返回巴黎與財金官員及央行召開緊急會議，希望加快落實減赤建議，但市場擔心，法國本周五公布的數據將證實該國經濟放緩，令當局難以推行削赤。薩爾科齊昨午離開巴黎，繼續放假。
市場一直擔心歐債危機危及歐元區兩大經濟體德國與法國。雖然歐洲央行購買意大利及西班牙債券，令兩國債息下跌，但風險卻向歐元區內出資最多的德法兩國轉移。法國債息及CDS近日持續上升，德國5年CDS周二亦罕有超越英國，是2008年來首次。
歐元區最小成員國塞浦路斯的財政問題亦備受關注。惠譽昨日把塞浦路斯的信貸評級由A-降兩級至BBB，並警告該國或需歐盟出手援救。
後記 : 美國是日跌超過500點(5%)，德國與法國跌5%，但香港只跌1%
自標普上周下調美國評級後，市場一直揣測法國可能是下一個失去AAA評級的國家。標普日前派定心丸稱法國評級展望維持為「穩定」，但法國可能失去AAA的傳言昨日再度炒起。法國銀行業，尤其是持有大批「歐豬」國債的銀行，股價齊聲急挫。法興急跌20%，錄得23 年來單日最大跌幅，股價跌至兩年半新低。其他法國銀行股亦暴挫，最大的法國巴黎銀行（BNP Paribas）股價下跌13%，法國農業信貸銀行（Crédit Agricole）亦跌超過14%。
希臘國債減值 法興急挫20%
法國銀行業持有逾400億歐元希臘國債，是希臘最大的海外債主。法興上周表示，由於持有的希臘國債減值，該行將無法達到明年的收益目標，投資者關注其財政健康。市場近日流傳關於法興的不少傳言。英國《星期日郵報》周日曾引述消息人士指法興財政危在旦夕，「已在危機邊緣」，但事後撤回並道歉。昨日開市後，《金融時報》一個網誌表示法興似乎在變賣黃金，但隨後更正指可能是路透社系統出錯。
法興昨發聲明「否認所有市場謠言」。德銀及法巴等歐洲銀行較早時亦已就持有的希臘國債撇帳。分析一直擔心，歐洲銀行可能沒有足夠資金抵禦進一步撇帳。 加上昨日有消息指希臘將會擴大其換債計劃規模，將2020年後到期的國債亦包括在內，再令市場擔心歐洲銀行的財政狀况。
在銀行股拖累下，法國股市急挫逾5%。法國主權債務信貸違約掉期（CDS） 見歷史新高。法國官員昨否認法國將失去AAA評級，三大評級機構惠譽、穆迪與標普亦重申會維持評級。歐盟6個AAA評級國家中，以法國負債最高，現時債務與GDP的比率達85%，遠超歐盟建議的60%水平。法國去年財赤與GDP比例為7.1%，亦遠高於歐盟規定的3％水平。
負債遠超歐盟建議水平
法國政府預計，今年財赤與GDP比率減至5.3％，並計劃在明年把財赤減至4.6%，2013年減至3%。法國總統薩爾科齊昨臨時中斷休假，返回巴黎與財金官員及央行召開緊急會議，希望加快落實減赤建議，但市場擔心，法國本周五公布的數據將證實該國經濟放緩，令當局難以推行削赤。薩爾科齊昨午離開巴黎，繼續放假。
市場一直擔心歐債危機危及歐元區兩大經濟體德國與法國。雖然歐洲央行購買意大利及西班牙債券，令兩國債息下跌，但風險卻向歐元區內出資最多的德法兩國轉移。法國債息及CDS近日持續上升，德國5年CDS周二亦罕有超越英國，是2008年來首次。
歐元區最小成員國塞浦路斯的財政問題亦備受關注。惠譽昨日把塞浦路斯的信貸評級由A-降兩級至BBB，並警告該國或需歐盟出手援救。
後記 : 美國是日跌超過500點(5%)，德國與法國跌5%，但香港只跌1%
星期五, 8月 05, 2011
星期五, 7月 29, 2011
星期四, 7月 21, 2011
星期四, 6月 30, 2011
星期三, 6月 08, 2011
星期二, 5月 31, 2011
星期三, 5月 25, 2011
星期三, 5月 18, 2011
星期四, 5月 05, 2011
星期五, 4月 29, 2011
星期五, 4月 15, 2011
投資生涯的三大失敗之作
鞍鋼（347）發盈警，首季盈利大跌94%，由賺11億變7500萬，以鋼鐵全年只靠首三季賺錢嚟睇，揸多10年都冇運行，於10.56於晒，輸$40080，或24%，係人生三大失敗投資之一，其餘係大唐發電同中國中核。
星期四, 3月 31, 2011
星期二, 3月 22, 2011
Mr. Market
Financial-market participants must choose between investment and speculation. Those who choose investment are faced with another choice, this time between two opposing views of the financial markets. One view, widely held among academics and increasingly among institutional investors, is that the financial markets are efficient and that trying to outperform the average is futile. Matching the market return is the best you can hope for. Those who attempt to outperform the market will incur high transaction costs and taxes, causing them to underperform instead.
The other view is that some securities are inefficiently priced, creating opportunities for investors to profit with low risk. This view was perhaps best expressed by Benjamin Graham, who posited the existence of a Mr. Market. An ever helpful fellow, Mr. Market stands ready every business day to buy or sell a vast array of securities in virtually limitless quantities at prices that he sets. He provides this valuable service free of charge. Sometimes Mr. Market sets prices at levels where you would neither want to buy nor sell. Frequently, however, he becomes irrational. Sometimes he is optimistic and will pay for more than securities are worth. Other times he is pessimistic, offering to sell securities for considerably less than underlying value. Value investors – who buy at a discount from underlying value – are in a position to take advantage of Mr. Market’s irrationality.
Some investors – really speculators – mistakenly look to Mr. Market for investment guidance. They observe him setting a lower price for a security and, unmindful of his rationality, rush to sell their holdings, ignoring their own assessment of underlying value. Other times they see him raising prices and, trusting his lead, buy in at the higher figure as if he knew more than they.
The reality is that Mr. Market knows nothing, being the product of the collective action of thousands of buyers and sellers who themselves are not always motivated by investment fundamentals. Emotional investors and speculators inevitably lose money; investors who take advantage of Mr. Market’s periodic irrationality, by contrast, have a good chance of enjoying long-term success.
Mr. Market’s daily fluctuations may seem to provide feedback for investors’ recent decisions. For a recent purchase decision rising prices provide positive reinforcement; falling prices, negative reinforcement. If you buy a stock that subsequently rises in price, it is easy to allow the positive feedback provided by Mr. Market to influence your judgment. You may start to believe that the security is worth more than you previously thought and refrain from selling, effectively placing the judgment of Mr. Market above your own. You may even decide to buy more shares of this stock, anticipating Mr. Market’s future movements. As long as the price appears to be rising, you may choose to hold, perhaps even ignoring deteriorating business fundamentals or diminution in underlying value.
Similarly, when the price of a stock declines after its initial purchase, most investors, somewhat naturally, become concerned. They started to worry that Mr. Market may know more than they do or that their original assessment was in error. It is easy to panic and sell at just the wrong time. Yet if the security were truly a bargain when it was purchased, the rational course of action would be to take advantage of this even better bargain and buy more.
Louis Lowenstein has warned us not to confuse the real success of an investment with its mirror success in the stock market. The fact that a stock price rises does not ensure that the underlying business is doing well or that the price increase is justified by a corresponding increase in underlying value. Likewise, a price fall in and of itself does not necessarily reflect adverse business developments or value deterioration.
It is vitally important for investors to distinguish stock price fluctuations from underlying business reality. If the general tendency is for buying to beget more buying and selling to precipitate more selling, investors must flight the tendency to capitulate to market forces. You cannot ignore the market – ignoring a source of investment opportunities would obviously be a mistake – but you must think for yourself and not allow the market to direct you. Value in relation to price, not price alone, must determine your investment decisions. If you look to Mr. Market as a creator of investment opportunities (where price departs from underlying value), you have the makings of a value investor. If you insist on looking to Mr. Market for investment guidance, however, you are probably best advised to hire someone else to manage your money.
Security prices move up and down for two basic reasons: to reflect business reality (or investor perceptions of that reality) or to reflect short-term variations in supply and demand. Reality can change in a number of ways, some company-specific, others macroeconomic in nature. If Coca-Cola’s business expands or prospects improve and the stock price increases proportionally, the rise may simply reflect an increase in business value. If Aetna’s share price plunges when a hurricane causes billions of dollars in catastrophic losses, a decline in total market value approximately equal to the estimated losses may be appropriate. When the shares of Fund American Companies, Inc., surge as a result of the unexpected announcement of the sale of its major subsidiary, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, at a very high price, the price increase reflects the sudden and nearly complete realization of underlying value. On a macroeconomic level a broad-based decline in interest rates, a drop in corporate tax rates, or a rise in the expected rate of economic growth could each precipitate a general increase in security prices.
Security prices sometimes fluctuate, not based on any apparent changes in reality, but on changes in investor perception. The shares of many biotechnology companies doubled and tripled in the first months of 1991, for example despite a lack of change in company or industry fundamentals that could possibly have explained that magnitude of increase. The only explanation for price rise was that investors were suddenly willing to pay much more than before to buy the same thing.
In the short run supply and demand alone determine market prices. If there are many large sellers and few buyers, prices fall, sometimes beyond reason, Supply-and-demand imbalances can result from year-end tax selling, an institutional stampede out of a stock that just reported disappointing earnings, or an unpleasant rumor. Most day-to-day market price fluctuations result from supply-and-demand variations rather than from fundamental developments.
Investors will frequently not know why security prices fluctuate. They may change because of, in the absence of, or in complete indifference to changes in underlying value. In the short run investor perception may be as important as reality itself in determining security prices. It is never clear which future events are anticipated by investors and thus already reflected in today’s security prices. Because security prices can change for any number of reasons and because it is impossible to know what expectations are reflected in any given price level, investors must look beyond security prices to underlying business value, always comparing the two as part of the investment process.
The other view is that some securities are inefficiently priced, creating opportunities for investors to profit with low risk. This view was perhaps best expressed by Benjamin Graham, who posited the existence of a Mr. Market. An ever helpful fellow, Mr. Market stands ready every business day to buy or sell a vast array of securities in virtually limitless quantities at prices that he sets. He provides this valuable service free of charge. Sometimes Mr. Market sets prices at levels where you would neither want to buy nor sell. Frequently, however, he becomes irrational. Sometimes he is optimistic and will pay for more than securities are worth. Other times he is pessimistic, offering to sell securities for considerably less than underlying value. Value investors – who buy at a discount from underlying value – are in a position to take advantage of Mr. Market’s irrationality.
Some investors – really speculators – mistakenly look to Mr. Market for investment guidance. They observe him setting a lower price for a security and, unmindful of his rationality, rush to sell their holdings, ignoring their own assessment of underlying value. Other times they see him raising prices and, trusting his lead, buy in at the higher figure as if he knew more than they.
The reality is that Mr. Market knows nothing, being the product of the collective action of thousands of buyers and sellers who themselves are not always motivated by investment fundamentals. Emotional investors and speculators inevitably lose money; investors who take advantage of Mr. Market’s periodic irrationality, by contrast, have a good chance of enjoying long-term success.
Mr. Market’s daily fluctuations may seem to provide feedback for investors’ recent decisions. For a recent purchase decision rising prices provide positive reinforcement; falling prices, negative reinforcement. If you buy a stock that subsequently rises in price, it is easy to allow the positive feedback provided by Mr. Market to influence your judgment. You may start to believe that the security is worth more than you previously thought and refrain from selling, effectively placing the judgment of Mr. Market above your own. You may even decide to buy more shares of this stock, anticipating Mr. Market’s future movements. As long as the price appears to be rising, you may choose to hold, perhaps even ignoring deteriorating business fundamentals or diminution in underlying value.
Similarly, when the price of a stock declines after its initial purchase, most investors, somewhat naturally, become concerned. They started to worry that Mr. Market may know more than they do or that their original assessment was in error. It is easy to panic and sell at just the wrong time. Yet if the security were truly a bargain when it was purchased, the rational course of action would be to take advantage of this even better bargain and buy more.
Louis Lowenstein has warned us not to confuse the real success of an investment with its mirror success in the stock market. The fact that a stock price rises does not ensure that the underlying business is doing well or that the price increase is justified by a corresponding increase in underlying value. Likewise, a price fall in and of itself does not necessarily reflect adverse business developments or value deterioration.
It is vitally important for investors to distinguish stock price fluctuations from underlying business reality. If the general tendency is for buying to beget more buying and selling to precipitate more selling, investors must flight the tendency to capitulate to market forces. You cannot ignore the market – ignoring a source of investment opportunities would obviously be a mistake – but you must think for yourself and not allow the market to direct you. Value in relation to price, not price alone, must determine your investment decisions. If you look to Mr. Market as a creator of investment opportunities (where price departs from underlying value), you have the makings of a value investor. If you insist on looking to Mr. Market for investment guidance, however, you are probably best advised to hire someone else to manage your money.
Security prices move up and down for two basic reasons: to reflect business reality (or investor perceptions of that reality) or to reflect short-term variations in supply and demand. Reality can change in a number of ways, some company-specific, others macroeconomic in nature. If Coca-Cola’s business expands or prospects improve and the stock price increases proportionally, the rise may simply reflect an increase in business value. If Aetna’s share price plunges when a hurricane causes billions of dollars in catastrophic losses, a decline in total market value approximately equal to the estimated losses may be appropriate. When the shares of Fund American Companies, Inc., surge as a result of the unexpected announcement of the sale of its major subsidiary, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, at a very high price, the price increase reflects the sudden and nearly complete realization of underlying value. On a macroeconomic level a broad-based decline in interest rates, a drop in corporate tax rates, or a rise in the expected rate of economic growth could each precipitate a general increase in security prices.
Security prices sometimes fluctuate, not based on any apparent changes in reality, but on changes in investor perception. The shares of many biotechnology companies doubled and tripled in the first months of 1991, for example despite a lack of change in company or industry fundamentals that could possibly have explained that magnitude of increase. The only explanation for price rise was that investors were suddenly willing to pay much more than before to buy the same thing.
In the short run supply and demand alone determine market prices. If there are many large sellers and few buyers, prices fall, sometimes beyond reason, Supply-and-demand imbalances can result from year-end tax selling, an institutional stampede out of a stock that just reported disappointing earnings, or an unpleasant rumor. Most day-to-day market price fluctuations result from supply-and-demand variations rather than from fundamental developments.
Investors will frequently not know why security prices fluctuate. They may change because of, in the absence of, or in complete indifference to changes in underlying value. In the short run investor perception may be as important as reality itself in determining security prices. It is never clear which future events are anticipated by investors and thus already reflected in today’s security prices. Because security prices can change for any number of reasons and because it is impossible to know what expectations are reflected in any given price level, investors must look beyond security prices to underlying business value, always comparing the two as part of the investment process.
星期五, 3月 04, 2011
Investments and Speculations
Just as financial market participants can be divided into two groups, investors and speculators, assets and securities can often be characterized as either investments or speculations. The distinction is not clear to most people. Both investments and speculations can be bought and sold. Both typically fluctuate in price and can thus appear to generate investments returns. But there is one critical difference : investments throw off cash flow for the benefit of the owners; speculations do not. The return to the owners of speculations depends exclusively on the vagaries of the resale market.
The greedy tendency to want to own anything that has recently been rising in price lures many people into purchasing speculations. Stocks and bonds go up and down in price, but there should be no confusion as to which as to which are the true investments. Collectibles, such as art, antiques, rare coins, and baseball cards, are not investments, but rank speculations. This may not be of consequence to the Chase Manhattan Bank, which in the late 1980s formed a fiund for its clients to invest in art, or to David L. Paul, former chairman of the now insolvent CenTrust Savings and Loan Association, who spend $13 million of the thrift's money to purchase just one painting. Even Wall Street, which knows better, chooses at times to blur the distinction. Salomon Brothers, for example, now publishes the rate of return on various asset classes, including in the same list U.S. Treasury bills, stocks, impressionist and old master paintings, and Chinese ceramics. In Salomon's June 1989 rankings the latter categories were ranked at the top of the list, far outdistancing the returns from true investments.
Investments, even very long-term investments like newly planted timber properties, will eventually throw off cash flow. A machine makes widgets that are marketed, a building is occupied by tenants who pay rent, and trees on a timber property are eventually harvested and sold. By contrast, collectibles throw off no cash flow; the only cash they can generate is from their eventual sale. The future buyer is likewise dependent on his or her own prospects for resale.
The value of collectibles, therefore, fluctuates solely with supply and demand. Collectibles have not historically been recognized as stores of value, thus their prices depends on the vagaries of taste, which are certainly subject to change. The apparent value of collectibles is based on circular reasoning: people buy because others have recently bought. This has the effect of bidding up prices, which attracts publicity and creates the illusion of attractive returns. Such logic can fail at any time.
Investment success requires an appropriate mind-set. Investing is serious business, not entertainment. If you participate in the financial markets at all, it is crucial to do so as an investor, not as a speculator, and to be certain that you understand the difference. Needless to say, investors are able to distinguish Pepsico from Picasso and understand the difference between an investment and a collectible. When your hard-earned savings and future financial security are at stake, the cost of not distinguishing is unacceptably high.
The greedy tendency to want to own anything that has recently been rising in price lures many people into purchasing speculations. Stocks and bonds go up and down in price, but there should be no confusion as to which as to which are the true investments. Collectibles, such as art, antiques, rare coins, and baseball cards, are not investments, but rank speculations. This may not be of consequence to the Chase Manhattan Bank, which in the late 1980s formed a fiund for its clients to invest in art, or to David L. Paul, former chairman of the now insolvent CenTrust Savings and Loan Association, who spend $13 million of the thrift's money to purchase just one painting. Even Wall Street, which knows better, chooses at times to blur the distinction. Salomon Brothers, for example, now publishes the rate of return on various asset classes, including in the same list U.S. Treasury bills, stocks, impressionist and old master paintings, and Chinese ceramics. In Salomon's June 1989 rankings the latter categories were ranked at the top of the list, far outdistancing the returns from true investments.
Investments, even very long-term investments like newly planted timber properties, will eventually throw off cash flow. A machine makes widgets that are marketed, a building is occupied by tenants who pay rent, and trees on a timber property are eventually harvested and sold. By contrast, collectibles throw off no cash flow; the only cash they can generate is from their eventual sale. The future buyer is likewise dependent on his or her own prospects for resale.
The value of collectibles, therefore, fluctuates solely with supply and demand. Collectibles have not historically been recognized as stores of value, thus their prices depends on the vagaries of taste, which are certainly subject to change. The apparent value of collectibles is based on circular reasoning: people buy because others have recently bought. This has the effect of bidding up prices, which attracts publicity and creates the illusion of attractive returns. Such logic can fail at any time.
Investment success requires an appropriate mind-set. Investing is serious business, not entertainment. If you participate in the financial markets at all, it is crucial to do so as an investor, not as a speculator, and to be certain that you understand the difference. Needless to say, investors are able to distinguish Pepsico from Picasso and understand the difference between an investment and a collectible. When your hard-earned savings and future financial security are at stake, the cost of not distinguishing is unacceptably high.
星期一, 2月 28, 2011
星期三, 2月 09, 2011
星期一, 1月 31, 2011
星期六, 1月 29, 2011
強棒基金經理人養成要件
1. 視股票投資為正規事業
2. 增加投資規模
3. 減少投資組合周轉率
4. 運用另類績效評估指標
5. 學習思考機率
6. 認知誤判的心理分析
7. 不理會市場預測
8. 等待有利投資機會
2. 增加投資規模
3. 減少投資組合周轉率
4. 運用另類績效評估指標
5. 學習思考機率
6. 認知誤判的心理分析
7. 不理會市場預測
8. 等待有利投資機會
星期四, 1月 27, 2011
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